The civil-military leadership of Pakistan has taken nine months to
settle issues with the US arising out of the Salala incident last
November that could have been better resolved in nine days.
As a result, Pakistan's international isolation has grown, its
economy has foundered and the domestic credibility of the civil and
military leadership has been eroded. There will be adverse short and
long term consequences of this gross policy miscalculation. Consider.
Nine months ago, in exchange for reopening the NATO supply lines, the
US was ready to "apologise", pay compensation, give "assurances" that
Salala would not be repeated, respect Pakistan's "sovereignty" and
release over US$2 billion in Coalition Support/Kerry Lugar funds. But
Pakistan said no, it wanted much more; it demanded an end to drone
strikes, it wanted twenty times the transit fee per container-truck, it
insisted that the NATO trucks would not carry any weapons and the CIA
footprint should be drastically reduced, etc. Indeed, after the military
cunningly passed the buck to the Zardari government three months later,
Senator Raza Rabbani's bipartisan parliamentary committee deliberated
for another three months to churn out a list of 35 demands and COAS
General Ashfaq Kayani and President Asif Zardari prevaricated for
another three months before signing on the dotted line. And what did
Pakistan get from the US?
It didn't get an "apology" from President Obama like the Afghans did
earlier. Instead, Hillary Clinton said "we're sorry for the losses
suffered by the Pakistan military ... and we are both sorry for losses
suffered by both our countries in this fight against terrorists." It
didn't obtain a halt to drone strikes. It didn't get a penny more on
transit fees. And NATO trucks will still carry uninspected military
hardware (listed as supplies for the Afghan National Security Forces).
So how did Pakistan miscalculate?
It thought it had the US over a barrel because the Northern Network
was unfeasible. In the event, the US spent $1 billion dollars to resist
our pressure. It thought boycotting the Bonn and Chicago moots would
compel NATA to listen to us. But the US went ahead anyway, formulating
its end-game strategy for Afghanistan without inputs from Pakistan.
Islamabad thought it could hang on without CSF, Kerry Lugar aid and
the IMF. But it couldn't. The rupee has lost nearly 10 per cent of its
value, the budget is broke and domestic debt has soared.
It also miscalculated the intensity of counter pressure by the US.
First, it ratcheted up pressure in the US Congress to stop American
economic and military aid to Pakistan pending restoration of NATO supply
lines. Second, the US Congress raised the spectre of declaring Pakistan
a state sponsor of terrorism by threatening to label the Haqqani
network and the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba as global terrorist organisations, the
implication being that economic and military sanctions would follow
under international law. Third, Washington persuaded Riyadh to hand over
Abu Jindal to India, raising the threat of formally linking the ISI to
international terrorism. Fourth, it began to align itself with India,
asking for a greater Indian commitment to the future of Afghanistan and
pledging a major strategic partnership with it in the Grand Silk Route
strategy to open up and link emerging markets in the next few decades.
The Pakistani military miscalculated on two fronts. It underestimated
America's resolve to fashion the Afghan end-game according to its own
national interests. It also overestimated the Zardari government's
anxiety to please the Americans by taking sole ownership of the decision
to restore the NATO supply lines. In the event, the Americans didn't
blink and the Zardari government took refuge behind parliament to
protect its flanks from the opposition. The net result, to Pakistan's
great disadvantage, was a delay in diffusing the crisis.
The military and government are hoping that US funds and weapons will
flow to ease their respective problems. But the opposition and media
are likely to exploit the anti-American public sentiment to blast the
belated agreement.
Resumption of drone strikes and American exhortations to "do more"
against the Haqqani network will lead to criticism of the military and
political leaders for "selling out" to the Americans.
Indeed, a majority of Pakistanis, according to a Pew Research Poll,
think that US military and economic aid to Pakistan has a negative
impact on the country.
There is a rupture between the Pentagon and the Pakistani military.
It was triggered by bitter strategic differences about the role of US in
shaping the future of Afghanistan and cannot be papered over by the
latest terms of "reconciliation". Other flash points are bound to occur
in the run-up to 2014. The problem is that the GLOC point of rupture has
isolated Pakistan among the 47 influential countries that comprise
NATO. Worse, the continuing tragedy is that Pakistan's civilmilitary
leadership has been unwilling and unable to formulate a new national
interest paradigm for Pakistan.
There have been far too many debacles on the watch of the current civil-military leadership. It is time for a change of guard.
Source
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/us-pressure-made-pakistan-blink/1/203998.html